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Abstract 
This paper explores and identifies the natural disaster response capabilities, and uncovers 
the underlying processes and mechanisms of which businesses respond to natural 
disasters. Evidence from two comparative extreme cases of factories dealing with the 
Thailand 2011 flood were examined, which resulted in a process framework that exhibits 
enabler response capabilities, organization response capabilities and underpinning 
response capabilities required to achieve a successful response. It highlights that the 
successful factory had better flexibility, speed and continuous updating enabler response 
capabilities as well as activated, adaptable and the ability to extend higher amounts of 
underpinning response capabilities.  
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Introduction 
The increase in frequency and severity of natural disasters (ND) intensifies impacts on 
business performance and the world economy. Thus, there is a need for more supply chain 
resiliency, mitigation (Wright, 2013), and risk management capabilities. ND is considered 
as a µUDQGRPSKHQRPHQD¶6KHIIL	5LFHZLWK³ORZ-likelihood and high-impact 
ULVNV´ 7UNPDQ 	 0F&RUPDFN  2NH 	 Gopalakrishnan, 2009). An extensive 
amount of studies have acknowledged the need for capabilities in accordance with three 
disaster phases: preparation, response and recovery (Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009). So 
far, the literature has focused mainly on capabilities in two phases: recovery capabilities 
(Craighead et al., 2007) and preparation (Knemeyer et al., 2009). In real life, not all 
businesses manage to prepare for mitigation against ND; therefore, the severity of 
damages relies on the ability to respond. Therefore, there is a need for both academics 
and practitioners to understand what effective response capabilities are required for ND.  
This paper examines and unfolds the abilities to respond to ND by investigating how 
businesses in Thailand responded to flooding. In the year 2011, many electronics 
manufacturers in Thailand, one of the largest sources of computer hard drives, were 
submerged; this caused extensive and long term impacts to companies around the world 
(Wright, 2013). The estimated damages were around $46.5 billion which is accounted for 
more than 25% of world production (World Bank, 2011). By comparing two extreme 
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cases of factories affected by the Thailand 2011 flood, this paper answers two questions: 
(1) What constitutes response capabilities in a flooding situation? And, what are the 
procedure, underlying processes and mechanism to create response capabilities? The 
effective response capabilities are exhibited in a framework. 
 
Literature and Conceptual Background 
Supply chain resilience and risk management are two major strands of literature that 
identify capabilities for mitigating supply chain disruptions including those generated by 
natural disasters (ND). Supply chain resilience offers a system perspective that helps 
reduce the severity of supply chain disruptions (Hanifan, 2007), enable operational 
continuity (Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009), and the ³return to its original state or move 
WR D QHZ PRUH GHVLUDEOH VWDWH´ Christopher and Peck, 2004). The supply chain risk 
management literature emphasizes guidance for risk identification, risk assessment tools, 
and evaluation of risk and risk mitigation strategies (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008). The 
literature emphasizes mainly advance preparation or planning based on capabilities such 
as flexibility (Sheffi and Rice, 2005), redundancy (Sheffi and Rice, 2005; Jüttner and 
Maklan, 2011), collaboration (Christopher and Peck, 2004) and agility (Wieland and 
Wallenburg, 2012). Therefore, there is less known about which ways and when managers 
should apply resilience capabilities if ND occur. 
With regards to ND, the supply chain literature can learn from the disaster management 
literature because it provides knowledge for understanding, controlling and management 
of disasters. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC, 
2014) considers GLVDVWHUPDQDJHPHQWDV³the organization and management of resources 
and responsibilities for dealing with all humanitarian aspects of emergencies´ 7KH
disaster management literature typically divides disasters into different phases and it is 
well acknowledged from scholars of various disciplines (e.g. crisis management, 
emergency management and humanitarian logistics management, etc.) to adapt this lens 
to enhance their abilities in dealing with the threats (Faulkner, 2001; Moe and 
Pathranarakul, 2006). This integration allows an understanding and design appropriate to 
the abilities that fit with the characteristics of threats in each phase. Before the disaster, 
the relevant stakeholder may try to mitigate by building dams, conducting plans, 
predicting, providing early warning, and preparing necessary resources. During the 
disaster, a company needs to deal with the emergency by rescuing, evacuating and 
protecting lives and properties while trying to continue operations and start making 
recoveries. After the disaster, the emphasis is on recovery, reconstruction and resolution. 
Therefore, these studies focus on the tasks of non-profit organizations, governments and 
communities which have not been much covered by the supply chain resilience and risk 
management literature.  
The extent to which a company can prepare for and respond to ND depends on the 
scale and time available for preparation. By understanding the characteristics of ND, such 
as frequency, magnitude, duration of impact, intensity, and speed of onset, it is possible 
to prepare appropriately budget and resources, and improving mitigation performance. 
FRU LQVWDQFH ³VSHHG RI RQVHW´ DQG ³DYDLODELOLW\ RI SHUFHSWXDO FXH´ DUH LPSRUWDQW
knowledge that provides adequate forewarning for detecting and reducing the impact of 
ND (Lindell, 1994) have not been integrated into supply chain literature yet. Response 
capabilities have been recognized as a major component of supply chain resiliency 
(Tukamuhabwa et al., 2015), during the response phase of a disruptive event. The diverse 
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literature has identified warning, collaboration, coordination, and communication are key 
to a successful response.  
It is popular for supply chain scholars to adapt dynamic capabilities framework 
(sensing, seizing and reconfiguring) in their works for understanding capabilities in 
dealing with supply chain disruptions (Su et. al., 2014; Vanpoucke, 2014; Ambulkar et 
al., 2015). The concept offers the view that a company can ³LQWHJUDWH EXLOG DQG
reconfigure internal and external competence to address rapidly changing environmenW´ 
(Teece et al., 1997, p. 516). This study acknowledges the importance of the dynamic 
capabilities. Although, the investigation is in the context of an HPHUJHQF\VLWXDWLRQRU³DG
KRF SUREOHP VROYLQJ´ PD\ QRW PHHt the requirement of the definition of dynamic 
capabilities (Winter, 2003), the concept of µ]ero-OHYHO¶ DQG µKLJKHU RUGHU FDSDELOLWLHV¶
(Winter, 2003) offers an insight of multi-level of capabilities. Perhaps such a 
conceptualization could provide us a view on where response capabilities are developed.       
 
Methodology  
The research is based on a comparative case study (Eisenhardt, 1989; Ketokivi & Choi, 
2014). Following a purposive sampling strategy, the research identified two polarised 
case exemplars based in Thailand, which had experienced flooding in 2011, i.e., Food 
company (FoodCo) recovered fast and Polyester Product Company (PolyCo) recovered 
slow. Table 1 shows the summary of the case study profiles. Semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with managers in operations, supply chain, risk management and related 
positions, six in the first and nine in the second company. The interviewees were asked 
to describe how/why they responded to the flood and what the important factors were. 
The interviews were conducted in two rounds in the year 2015 and 2016 by using face-
to-face, telephone interview, site visits. Based on the first round, some initial ideas and 
concepts were identified. In the second round, follow-up interviews helped refine the 
concepts and gain in-depth understanding of the response capabilities. 
Table 1: Summary of the company profiles in the year 2011 
 
Findings:  
The theoretical framework in Fig.1 emerged from the empirical data. This paper 
defines response capabilities as ³WKH DELOLW\ WR UHVSRQG WR WKH HPHUJLQJ 1' LQFLGHQW
Profiles PolyCo FoodCo 
Business sector Polyester product Ready to eat Food 
Number of employees  
(at flooding site) 
~ 450  ~ 4000  
Primary suppliers and 
customers 
Suppliers: 20% import, 80% 
domestics (main raw materials were 
from affiliated companies) 
Customers: 55% export, 45% 
domestic 
Suppliers: 90% domestic 
Customers: 10% exports (85% 
affiliated company that owns more 
than 4,000 convenience stores, 15% 
external) 
Production locations in 
Thailand  
3 locations  1 location  
ND plans prior to the 
2011 flooding 
Yes, but limited (was first developed 
in 2010) 
No plan 
Number of interviewees 9 (administration, production, 
purchasing, power & Utilities, 
HRD, utilities, vice president of 
manufacturing, Director) 
6 (Logistics, production, 
purchasing, safety, assistant general 
manager (export / risk 
management) 
Operations discontinuity  ~ 7 months ~ 1 1/4 month 
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DLPLQJ DW DOOHYLDWLQJ LWV LPSDFW´. The coding identified three types of activities 
representing organization response capabilities and three enabler response capabilities 
clustered into response capabilities, and each of them are embedded by three 
underpinning capabilities. These responses and capabilities are illustrated in a form of 
continuous interaction and holistic build.  
 
Organization response Capabilities 
The company used organization response capabilities, which involved facilities 
protection, damage minimization and business and operational continuity to limit the 
amount of losses and impacts of ND. Organization response capabilities consisted of 
several strategies and activities to respond to ND in different emerging situations. 
Facilities protection. Facilities protection was used to limit the scope and magnitude 
of ND impacts on facilities, assets and operations. A common activity was to build 
temporary physical defences. Both companies used competent employees to obtain 
information on how to build flood-proof walls and they had good collaboration among 
staff. Prioritising of critical factors explains why FoodCo was successful while PolyCo 
failed in facilities protection. FoodCo only focused on the critical areas and equipment, 
while PolyCo staff decided to protect the whole area and took more time to make flood 
protection, while having a limited number of staff. The assistant general manager from 
FoodCo explained the prioritisation: ³:HOHIWWKLVDUHDWREHIORRGHGZHMXVWSURWHFWHG
WKHPDLQDUHDZKLFKZHUHWKHSURGXFWLRQ]RQHDWWKDWWLPH«As we did not have any flood 
SODQHDUOLHUVRZHRQO\SURWHFWWKHHOHFWULFDOV\VWHPURRP«LIZHFRXOGQRWSURWHFWDnd 
LWZDVIORRGHGLWWRRNDWOHDVWPRQWKV´ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Theoretical framework 
 
Close monitoring was another strategy that was associated with flood protection. Not 
all FoodCo staff left the plants when the flood came in, they still continuously monitored 
the flood levels and the barriers, and then enforced or repaired them accordingly. The 
high frequency of monitoring allowed the staff to react promptly even when the water 
rose higher than expected. These activities could not be done without human resources, 
competency and collaboration. The FoodCo staff employed their technical knowledge to 
develop new ways of building flood defences. They exhibited great commitments by 
aiding in reacting to the incident, regardless of tasks they were assigned to. 
Damage minimization. Damage minimization refers to the ability to reduce and 
eliminate further damages to assets, lives and operations in a timely manner. The analysis 
shows that the most common damage minimization practices involved assets relocation, 
plant shutdown, and evacuation of staff. The amount of disruptions and damages depend 
-ND incident management 
-Response resource access  
Enabler response capabilities 
Underpinning response capabilities:  
Accessing and sharing quality information, knowledge and skills, 
network collaboration 
 
 
-Foreseeing ND 
Response capabilities 
Organization response capabilities  
-Facilities protection 
-Damage Minimization 
-Business and operational Continuity 
- and operational 
        Continuous interaction 
         Embedded 
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on how the firms exercise the above activities. From the analysis, PolyCo had greater 
losses than FoodCo for several reasons. First, PolyCo did not relocate their assets and 
shut down the production systems properly because they did not foresee the situation and 
the instruction was not communicated properly. To illustrate, much of the equipment was 
lifted on to tables, but they were not high enough to escape from the flood. Furthermore, 
they focused on the wrong strategy, instead of working on damage minimization 
activities, they were working on flood protection. In contrast, prior to the arrival of the 
flood, the teams in FoodCo discussed and agreed to shut down the production operations. 
Even though the flood entered the site one day earlier than planned, due to the reduced 
production capacity before the flood arrived, damage to critical areas were reduced.  
Overall, there was limited use of damage minimization by both companies. This was 
due to the inexperience in dealing with flooding prior to the incident, leading to a lot of 
tasks to be carried out afterwards. In addition, the choice of relocating or shutting down 
the factory was an important decision because these activities induced huge amounts of 
expenses, while reducing sum amount of incomes.  
Time is a significant dimension that influences how well the firms exercise the 
protection and damage minimization activities appropriately. PolyCo could have 
achieved damage minimization timely if they had sufficient time for shutting down the 
plants and relocating the assets properly. PolyCo shifted from a protection strategy to 
damage minimization when the flood was entering the plant, so they did not have time to 
manage things well. The staff did not manage to move any finished goods or even contact 
their supply network for help. The goods were left to soak in the water. The production 
manager illustrated the problem: ³:HKDGQRWLPHWRVKLSPDWHULDOEHFDXVHLWFDPHVR
fast water and without much advance information. You will see now what our product is 
OLNHELJEXON\EDJKDVWRQVWRQVRIPDWHULDOV«7RVKLSWKDW\RXQHHGDORWRIWLPHV
aQGEUHDNHUDQGDORWRIUHVRXUFHVWKDWZHSHRSOHFRXOGQRWPDQDJHLQWLPH´ 
However, after the evacuation, some PolyCo staff came back to the factory to take out 
some of the important items such as computer servers and documentation. These activities  
helped them to recover the plant faster later on in the recovery phase. 
Business & Operational Continuity (BOC). BOC was used when the companies 
wanted to maintain operations, and deliver service and products to fulfil existing customer 
orders. It involved activating an emergency strategy, adjusting and realigning the supply 
chain flow and activities among supply network using an irregular system under 
constrained conditions. The activities were diverse between these two cases. FoodCo had 
a strong focus on continuing their operations and business; productions and logistics were 
restructured to be flexible and could operate under emergency condition. They applied 
more flexible logistics routes, alternative vehicles, introduced new loading systems and 
new supplier contracts. These activities were operated under the conditions of flood risk 
areas, traffic restriction and limited number of vehicles. Therefore, the staff could not 
plan far ahead and it needed real-time updates according to the situation. They also 
prioritized the production capability based on the available raw materials and customers. 
After detecting the warning sign, such as weather forecasting from media and 
filedwork monitoring, FoodCo stocked up resources for avoiding supply disruptions. This 
helped them continue doing their business far better than the other companies in the 
surrounding areas, until they decided to stop the operations. The purchasing manager of 
FoodCo explained their response strategies: ³$FWXDOO\ ZKHQ WKH IORRG DUULYHG RXU
factory, many suppliers already stopped the productions, but our factory was operating. 
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We could run our production longer than them because we had available materials to 
VXSSRUWDQGZHZRUNHGLQDGYDQFH´ 
PolyCo exercised BOC activities after they were flooded for maintaining supply to the 
customers. They activated a multiple production location strategy which was 
implemented as a part of their corporate risk diversification strategy. Their products were 
delivered by affiliated plants both domestically and overseas instead of flooded plants.  
Overall, there was one common activity among FoodCo and PolyCo, i.e., to relocate 
to new offices in other areas. This approach helped the companies to continue to operate, 
plan, share information and communicate with relevant stakeholders. Interestingly, 
organization response capabilities also enhanced the response capabilities, and vice versa. 
As such, after PolyCo was attacked by the flood and relocated to another area by the help 
of its affiliated company, the new office was temporarily used for meeting, continuing 
temporary transactions (e.g. planning, contact suppliers), and planning. Meanwhile some 
of FoodCo staff e.g. purchasing and logistics relocated to work near the site because it 
was more convenient to access resources and continue their operations.  
 
Enabler response capabilities  
The analysis suggests enabler response capabilities involved foreseeing ND, ND 
incident management and response resources access. These three capabilities were used 
in the first place and helped facilitate each organization response capability. At the same 
time, they are highlighted to have bi-directional relationship between organization 
response capabilities, ND incident management and response resource access. Therefore, 
these three activities interacted each other. Foreseeing appeared to be the first point that 
was required to support the other capabilities.   
 Foreseeing ND. The companies used foreseeing ND to understand ND and help decide 
appropriate further actions. These capabilities involved monitoring and detecting ND 
threats, and obtaining, forecasting, updating and interpreting ND and supply chain 
information. Incomplete and unavailable information is a common problem in disaster 
situations. The lack of foreseeing ND is one of crucial factor that differentiate FoodCo 
from PolyCo in terms of the exercise of appropriate organization response capabilities. 
The failure of PolyCo was partly due to missing information and low speed in obtaining 
correct information. The PolyCo purchasing manager admitted that they activated the 
wrong strategy at an inappropriate time because they misjudged the situation which 
resulted in high severity of disruptions, ³:HPLJKWKDYHWKHZURQJSODQV:HKDGQHYHU
thought the flood would be VXFKWKLVKHLJKW7KHSODQWZDVIORRGHGDOPRVWPHWHUV´ 
Because of the uncertain situation, missing information was a barrier to an accurate 
interpretation of the warning signs, it was necessary to find evidence from the reliable 
sources, and access quality and comprehensive information in a timely manner. FoodCo 
was proactive in obtaining and updating flood information in real-time on their own and 
from their networks and the use of collaboration. 
ND incident management. ND incident (emergency) management is the ability to 
operate, control and monitor emergency tasks to respond to an emerging and uncertain 
ND. It consisted of combinations of activities such as teams setting up, planning, meetings 
and decision making. Its application is concerned with the effectiveness of emergency 
process management. Overall, both FoodCo and PolyCo addressed the incident in a 
similar way, such as forming the teams from cross-sectional departments and using it as 
a command centre. Required information would be obtained for analysing and making 
decisions for having appropriate response activities. Decision-making concerning plans, 
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strategies and activities were decided from here and the tasks and responsibilities were 
assigned to the appropriate staff.  
However, there were some minor differences among the two companies. FoodCo 
assigned an appropriate and skillful staff member to be the team leader for the situation.  
They also used emergency meetings to generate new ideas and solve the problems. The 
staff would report and update their progress of their responsible tasks RQWKHµorganization 
response FDSDELOLWLHV¶WDVNVat the meeting for further decisions. These minor differences 
helped them gain most benefits from having incident management.  
Emergency plans had been long introduced in FoodCo and PolyCo, they focused on 
fire and other incidences rather than flooding. As it was )RRG&R¶V first exposure to 
extreme flooding, the team initiated flood plans and procedures from contacting their 
networks. The teams exhibited high attentiveness to the uncertain situations by 
continuously reviewing and updating their plans. As a result, the teams could react 
quickly to the changing situation, in comparison to PolyCo who were complacent in their 
flooding plans preparation, they did not actively update information in real time. The use 
of the plans in a reactive manner led PolyCo failing to cope with the rapid changes. 
Response resource access. Accessing response resources means searching, selecting 
and obtaining raw materials and equipment for organization responses capabilities.  In a 
chaos, the market did not function normally, the companies operated under conditions of 
supply constraints (Christopher and Peck, 2004) due to limited resources, traffic 
GLVUXSWLRQV DQG VXSSOLHUV¶ GLVUXSWLRQV Overcoming these barriers was challenging for 
both companies. Both cases illustrated that speed and network collaboration were two 
important factors that were associated with the amount of resources obtained. Prior to the 
most intense period of flooding, they did not find any difficulty in acquiring the resources 
within surrounding areas and this high level of preparation allowed them to build the 
flood walls for a certain period. Until the flood came higher, both companies realized the 
expected and the prepared resources were not enough; so, both companies searched the 
equipment in remote areas as well as requested their networks for assistance. For example, 
PolyCo accessed protective equipment such as big pumps, for making flood barriers by 
contacting local governments. FoodCo acquired additional flood equipment from their 
raw material suppliers. Furthermore, when facing supplies shortage the staff were also 
able to adapt the existing resources for new uses. This innovation helped save time and 
allowed for a quick reaction. 
With appropriate enabler response capabilities, FoodCo managed to protect their assets 
and tapped into damage minimization, business and operational continuity activities. 
Several strategies were executed successfully e.g. inventory management, alternative 
suppliers, supplier risk assessment. The purchasing teams had to restructure and modify 
inbound delivery systems and purchasing systems to emergency modes. FoodCo 
contacted their suppliers and kept raw materials in advance, and these high preparations 
enabled their capabilities to continue business and operations until deciding to shut down 
the factory.  
 
Underpinning response capabilities 
There are three common capabilities which are actively engaged in enabler response 
capabilities and organization response capabilities: abilities to access and share 
information, knowledge and skills, and network collaboration. The accessing and sharing 
the quality of information, knowledge and skills, and network collaboration came from 
existing resources that were built and embedded in routine activities for any other 
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purposes, and then the companies activated, adapted, and extended for responding to the 
disruption on an ad hoc basis. FoodCo and PolyCo attempted to access ND and SC 
information for the capabilities building and sharing to their network, such as the need to 
access information of protection equipment. Therefore, enabler response capabilities and 
organization response capabilities were built on these three capabilities, which enhanced 
each other and are integrated with the other capabilities. Somehow, different response 
capabilities required different underpinning response capabilities and at different levels. 
FoodCo and PolyCo had limited preparation to respond to flooding in advance, so the 
activation of underpinning response capabilities depended on the amount of the prior 
resources that previously existed.  
However, not everyone was able to activate, adapt and extend the existing capabilities 
for uses in flooding. Therefore, activation of such capabilities was noted of leading to 
failure or successful response. As such in the case of PolyCo they had good networks 
with other logistics and affiliated companies, but they lacked the ability to activate their 
prior resources and because of this their logistics companies failed to relocate their assets 
and resulting in high numbers of damages. In contrast, FoodCo was successful in the 
flood response, even though they did not have any plan previously. This was because they 
could quickly extend their existing resources and knowledge to the enable flood response 
by mobilizing the resources of their networks affiliated company, obtaining and sharing 
the quality of information.  
 
Discussions and conclusions 
This paper contributes to operations and supply chain literature in several manners. 
The study highlights the limitations of current understanding and extends the concept of 
response capabilities based on a focus on flooding. It highlights not only what they are, 
but also how, why and when response capabilities are effectively developed and work. 
The two comparative retrospective case studies of flooding disruptions in Thailand 2011 
reveal multi-level capabilities from a process perspective.  
This paper unveils responses to ND relies on enabler response capabilities, 
organization response capabilities and their underpinning response capabilities. Since we 
applied a process perspective, some of these capabilities are new to the operations and 
supply chain literature. The abilities to minimize damage and protect facilities do not only 
ensure safety and alleviate the impacts, but also promote recovery in the later phase. The 
ability to manage a ND incident on an ad-hoc basis, the ability to foresee ND and response 
resources access are backbones of responses for protecting from ND threats, minimizing 
damages and continuing operations and business. To be efficient in responding to ND 
capabilities, businesses should pay attention to such enabler response capabilities as well 
as activating resources in an emergency context, often under-prepared, because they have 
the underpinning response capabilities to access and share quality information, 
knowledge, skills and network collaboration. 
Although the supply chain resilience literature has identified capabilities such as 
resilience, agility, flexibility, redundancy and collaboration, this paper provides empirical 
evidence for the development of theoretical explanations for the processes in which a 
company achieves such capabilities and responds to ND. This study shows that effective 
enabler response capabilities and organization response capabilities are achieved by three 
important qualities: flexibility, speed and continuous update. The study agrees with the 
literature that without flexibility and agility (similar to speed in this study), companies 
are hardly sense, respond (Sheffi and Rice, 2005), or adapt in any situations of disruption 
9 
 
(Carvalho et al., 2012). Nevertheless, this study adds that continuous update is a crucial 
quality of such capabilities to be along with unpredictable and volatile situation.  
The study also challenges the current belief in supply chain resilience literature, on the 
ways ND response strategy is developed. The study suggests that some resources could 
be acquired temporarily for ad-hoc use during the ND, if companies have good ND 
foreseeing abilities and the knowledge about how such resources might be accessed. For 
example, the literature claims the need for a redundancy strategy such that it is necessary 
to own or occupy such resources (e.g. alternative warehouses and inventories) in advance. 
Instead, this study shows that it is possible to just tap into redundant resources when 
needed, by activating a relationship or knowledge, because severe ND is infrequent. Keep 
more inventories for buffering against ND threats will increase cost in long run. 
This study unpacks the mechanisms in which enabler response capabilities and 
organization response capabilities operate, it found that during an emergency, companies 
could deal with ND without advance preparation because the three underpinning response 
capabilities: accessing and sharing the quality information, NQRZOHGJH 	 VNLOOV DQG
QHWZRUN FROODERUDWLRQ utilized for responding to ND. These three capabilities extend 
current views of operations and supply chain resilience literature (Tukamuhabwa et al., 
2015) to emergency situations. Even though these underpinning response capabilities are 
known to the literature, this paper adds new insights into when and how they are utilized 
during the response. The results show that FoodCo which had no ND plan, had higher 
response capabilities than PolyCo which had a ND plan because they activated, adapted 
and extended NQRZOHGJH 	 VNLOOV DQG QHWZRUN FROODERUDWLRQ as well as being able to 
access and share quality information. Therefore, FoodCo could activate the underpinning 
capabilities at a higher level to support protecting capabilities. In the terminology of 
capabilities of Winter (2003), these underlying capabilities are higher level capabilities 
that can be activated, adapted and extended for empowering response capabilities and 
responses to ND. This is perhaps the first study that divides ND response capabilities into 
multiple levels, such that it is now possible to explain what underpinning response 
capabilities are required to enable the capabilities to respond. 
The response capabilities and their underpinning response capabilities can be used to 
explain a process framework for understanding how a company decides and executes 
appropriate responses to ND. This framework has significant implications not only to 
academics, but also practitioners. With the framework, companies can identify, develop 
and adapt relevant capabilities and processes for real-life implementation, including what 
conditions the companies would be able to respond to ND without having prior ND 
preparation or experience. This finding differs from the mainstream literature in crisis 
management, business continuity, disaster management, risk management that suggest 
businesses need to prepare and invest resources for disruptive low-probability events such 
as ND that lead to an unknown level of damages. 
It is worth noting, that the response and underpinning response capabilities are not 
related to each other in a linear manner, but they emerge holistically from the individual 
activities. The response capabilities were developed ad-hoc from the integration of the 
existing capabilities while new ones were being developed. Although, some businesses 
can respond to ND without having organization preparation, it can be very risky as well. 
To be competent in future ND response, businesses are encouraged to develop such 
underpinning response capabilities in advance for utilizing and having appropriate 
respond to future unpredictable emerging ND situations.  
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Lastly, since this study aims to add and enrich our understanding in a rich context 
rather than generalization, one limitation is that it is based on a purposive sample from 
two firms collected from the Thailand 2011 flooding. To advance our knowledge, more 
case studies in other types of ND are needed. 
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